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Abstract
Individuals, di¤ering in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type
of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bis-
marckian) component (based on the workers past earnings) as opposed to the non-
contributive (Beveridgean) part (based on average contribution). The equilibrium col-
lective annuity is either a large mostly Bismarckian program, a smaller pure Beverid-
gean one (in accordance with empirical evidence), or nil. A larger correlation between
longevity and productivity, or a larger average life expectancy, both make the equi-
librium collective annuity program more Beveridgean, although at the expense of its
size.
Keywords: generosity, redistributiveness, pay-as-you-go pensions, collective annu-
ity, longevity, Kramer-Shepsle structure-induced equilibrium
JEL Codes: D78, H55
1 Introduction
A sizeable body of literature deals with the political determination of the characteristics
of a public pay-as-you-go pension system. The seminal paper by Browning (1975)
assumed that the only heterogeneity between voters is their age. Subsequent papers
(such as Casamatta et al. (2000a)) have enriched this approach by assuming that agents
also di¤er in income or in productivity. This richer set of individual traits has allowed
these papers to study the determination of both the size of the pension system and of
its redistributiveness across income levels. As for the latter, the literature (surveyed
by Galasso and Profeta (2002)) has contrasted so-called Bismarckian systems, where
the pension benet is proportional to the individual contribution, with Beveridgean
systems, where the benet is based on the average contribution.
The main stylized fact in this domain is that Bismarckian systems tend to be larger
(as measured by either the contribution rate or the share of public pensions in GDP)
than Beveridgean ones: see Table 1 in Casamatta et al. (2000b), Disney (2004) or
Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007). Very few papers have tried to explain this correlation.
Both Casamatta et al. (2000b) and Koethenbuerger et al. (2008) study the determina-
tion by the median voter of the size of the pension system as a function of the systems
type, measured by the (exogenous) relative importance of the contributive component,
dubbed the Bismarckian parameter. Casamatta et al. (2000b) assume exogenous wage
income and obtain an ambiguous impact of the Bismarckian parameter on the equilib-
rium size of the pension system. Koethenbuerger et al. (2008) introduce endogenous
labor supply, and obtain that larger labor supply distortions generated by the at-rate
Beveridgean pension system versus the earnings-related Bismarckian one, may explain
why more redistributive systems are smaller. Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007) study the
simultaneous determination of the size and type of pensions system. In their model,
agents di¤er in age, income and in ability to invest in the capital market. With only
three income groups, a small Beveridgean system is supported by low-income agents,
who gain from its redistributive feature, and high-income individuals, who seek to min-
imize their tax contribution and to invest their resources in a private scheme. Middle
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income individuals, instead, favor a large Bismarckian system. The degree of inequality
in earnings and the level of capital market returns determine which type of equilibrium
emerges.
An important dimension of heterogeneity among voters, which may play a critical
role in the determination of the pension system, is absent from these studies: longev-
ity. It is well known empirically how people of the same age di¤er in life expectancy.
Moreover, life expectancy is positively correlated with income or wealth, as shown by
Deaton and Paxon (1999) for the US, Attanasio and Emerson (2001) for the UK, and
Reil-Held (2000) for Germany. Average life expectancy has been increasing in most
countries for at least half a century. But these increases have not been shared equally
everywhere. For instance, in the US, the average male life expectancy at 65 has in-
creased from 15 to 16.1 years between 1986 and 2006 for individuals in the bottom half
of the earnings distribution, but from 16.5 to 21.5 years in the top half of the earn-
ings distribution (Waldron, 2007). It is thus important to assess the impact of such
variations on pension programs.
This paper studies how and to what extent di¤erences in longevity can contribute to
explaining two main questions. First, why some countries (such as France or Germany)
have a mostly contributive (Bismarckian) public pension system, while others (such as
the UK or Canada) develop a mainly non-contributive (Beveridgean) system. Second,
why Beveridgean systems tend to be smaller than Bismarckian ones. Tackling these
questions requires building a political economy model with a bidimensional type space
(income or productivity and life expectancy) and a bidimensional policy space (size and
degree of redistributiveness of the public pension program), where both policy dimen-
sions are chosen at the majority. Consequently, we need to go further than providing
comparative static results showing how the size depends on the exogenous type of the
system.
To the best of our knowledge, no paper has yet attempted to build such a model.
Few papers endogenize the public pension program when life expectancy is heterogen-
eous. Cremer et al. (2010) study the design of pension systems and the role played by
collective annuitiesas currently provided by public pension systems when individuals
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di¤er in longevity (as well as in productivity).1 Their approach is normative and based
on a utilitarian social welfare function. They contrast two schemes: a pure contributory
(Bismarckian) pension and a at rate (Beveridgean) pension. They show that the case
for collective annuities is stronger when they are associated with a at pension system.2
Other papers take a positive perspective. Leroux (2010) studies the case where
individuals have the same income but di¤er in their life span. She obtains that a
majority of voters are in favor of a pension system awarding the same annuity to everyone
if the distribution of longevity is negatively-skewed. Borck (2007) assumes from the
outset that richer individuals always live longer lives (so that heterogeneity between
agents is truly one dimensional) and shows how individual preferences and equilibrium
pension policies are a¤ected by the slope of the relationship between income and life
expectancy. Finally, De Donder and Hindriks (2002) assume that individuals di¤er both
in their productivity and survival probabilities. They focus on the majority chosen size
of the pension system as a function of its (exogenous) redistributiveness. They show
that the equilibrium amount of distortions associated to the pension system need not
decrease when the system is exogenously made less redistributive, because voters react
by increasing the pension systems size.3
Finally, some papers take a purely empirical path and study the empirical con-
sequences of life expectancy di¤erences for actual pension systems: Coronado et al.
(2000) for the US, Gil and Lopez-Casasnovas (1997) for Spain, Bommier et al. (2005)
for France and Reil-Held (2000) for Germany. These papers take the existing character-
istics of the pension system as given and assess how the joint distribution of income and
life expectancy a¤ects its redistributiveness across income levels. Not surprisingly, they
nd that, with public pensions not related to individual longevity, the positive correl-
1The dening characteristic of collective annuities is that they do not depend on an individuals
survival probability.
2With positive correlation between income and life expectancy, collective annuitization implies an
undesirable redistribution from low incomes to high incomes and a desirable redistribution from short
to long lived individuals. This is true both in Beveridgean and in Bismarckian systems. However, the
undesirable redistribution is mitigated under a Beveridgean system, which in turn redistributes from
high to low income individuals.
3Galasso and Profeta (2007) study the impact of ageing on the political determination of the size
and income redistributiveness of pension systems. In their model, agents live two periods and di¤er in
income, ageing being modeled as a decrease in the ratio of young (workers) over old (retirees) individuals.
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ation between income and longevity reduces signicantly the amount of redistribution
across income levels.
We assume that individuals live at most two periods, and di¤er in productivity and
in probability to be alive in the second period. In the rst period, they choose how
much to work and to save. In the second period, they retire, consume their saving
and the pension benet (if any), which is nanced by a linear payroll tax on labor
income. Pension benets are paid out as a collective annuity4 with both a (Bismarckian)
contributive and a (Beveridgean) non-contributive component. Voters choose both the
generosity (or size) of the pension system (the value of the proportional income tax
rate) and its degree of redistributiveness (or type, measured by the relative importance
of the contributive component, i.e., the Bismarckian parameter).
We study the joint political determination of the size and type of the collective
annuity program. It is well know that simultaneous voting over a bidimensional policy
space has generically no equilibrium (see De Donder et al. (2012) for instance). We
adopt the voting procedure rst proposed by Kramer (1972) and Shepsle (1979), where
each policy dimension is a majority voting equilibrium given the other dimension. We
obtain that the median productivity voter is decisive in the choice of both size and type
of pension system. We show the existence of a unique Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium,
with the following properties. If the Bismarckian return is larger than the interest
rate, the unique equilibrium is a large, mostly but not always exclusively Bismarckian
program. If the Bismarckian return is smaller than the interest rate (because of a large
correlation between income and life expectancy, for instance), the unique equilibrium
depends on the median productivity level in the economy. If this productivity level is
small, the unique equilibrium is a smaller and purely Beveridgean pension, while there
is no collective annuity program at equilibrium with a large median productivity. These
Shepsle equilibria correspond to the empirically observed large Bismarckian systems and
4We concentrate on the case where there is no private (individual) annuity market. This is in line
with the empirical evidence, since most retirees are reluctant to buy an annuity, so much so that this
behavioral pattern is often referred to as the annuity puzzle; see Brown et al. (2005). Finkelstein
and Poterba (2002, 2004) and Mitchell (1996) show that where they exist, rates of return of individual
annuities are much below actuarially fair levels and often signicantly less attractive than the implicit
return of collective annuities.
4
smaller Beveridgean ones.
Next we study how this political equilibrium is a¤ected by variations in the longev-
ity distribution. Both a larger positive correlation between income and longevity, and
a larger average life expectancy when uncorrelated with income generate a more redis-
tributive equilibrium pension program, although sometimes at the expense of its size.
Consequently, taking theses induced changes in the system into account, their net im-
pact on the amount of redistribution operated by collective annuities is not necessarily
negative.
Our analytical results show that the political equilibrium crucially depends on key
parameters such as the interest rate, the productivity and longevity distributions and
their correlation. In Section 7 we illustrate these results with simulations calibrated to
reect the stylized facts in two countries, namely France and the UK. The results show
that our model is consistent with the relevant empirical ndings, namely a Bismarckian
system for France and a Beveridgean system for the UK. Though admittedly highly
stylized, our simple model thus provides a possible explanation for the main features of
the retirement systems in these two countries. We also use the calibrated example to
study some comparative statics properties of the political equilibrium. Part of the results
provide mainly an illustration of our analytical ndings. In addition, the simulations
also allow us to study scenarios for which no analytical results could be obtained. For
instance, we examine the impact of an increase in average life expectancy when wage
and longevity are positively correlated.
2 The model
Consider an economy consisting of a continuum of agents who live (at most) two peri-
ods, working in the rst period and retiring in the second one. Individuals di¤er in
productivity w and in life expectancy, measured as the probability p to be alive in
period 2.5 The joint distribution of these two characteristics is denoted by H(w; p),
with marginal distributions F (w) over [0;1[ and G(p) over [0; 1]. At this point, we do
5We will use without distinction the terms life expectancy, longevity and survival probability when
referring to p.
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not assume a specic pattern of correlation between the two characteristics w and p.
However, to interpret our results we will concentrate on the empirically most relevant
case where productivity and life expectancy are positively correlated. The average pro-
ductivity is denoted by w while the average survival probability is p. We assume as usual
that the productivity distribution is positively skewed, so that the median productivity,
wmed is lower than the average, w.
Individual preferences are given by
u(c  h(z)) + pu(d);
where c is rst-period consumption, d is second-period consumption, h(z) measures the
disutility of supplying the labor quantity z and  is the discount rate. The function u
is increasing and concave while h is increasing and convex with h(0) = 0. First-period
consumption net of labor supply disutility is denoted by x = c  h(z).
Individuals take two private decisions, both in their rst period of life: labor supply
z and saving, s. The labor supply choice can be interpreted as either at the intensive
(number of hours worked) or extensive margin (such as the retirement age).6 We assume
away any borrowing constraint, so that saving can be negative.7 Saving has a gross
return of 1+r, where r > 0 denotes the exogenous world interest rate.8 The rst-period
individual budget constraint is given by
c = (1  )zw   s; (1)
where  2 [0; 1] is the payroll tax rate.
In their second period, individuals retire and consume their private saving and a
6 If agents retire before the end of the rst period, they do not collect any benet before the beginning
of the second period.
7The assumption that agents can borrow against future retirement income is of course a strong
assumption, made to simplify the algebra. As we explain in the concluding section, imposing borrow-
ing constraints would decrease the most-preferred tax rate of some voters, but would not a¤ect the
qualitative results we obtain.
8 In other words we consider a small open economy. Because of capital mobility this assumption
appears to be reasonable for essentially all European countries, but it may be debatable for the US. An
alternative interpretation of this assumption, in line with Atkinson and Sandmo (1980), is to say that
the interest rate is controlled by policy instruments (like public debt) which are not accounted for in
our setting.
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public pension benet b (if any), so that
d = (1 + r)s+ b:
Pension benets take the form of a collective annuity. They are nanced on a pay-as-
you go basis so that tax proceeds nance pensions paid to current retirees, as is most
often the case in reality. The annuity consists of a contributive (or Bismarckian) part
based on the individuals contributions, and of a non-contributive (or Beveridgean) part
linked to the average contribution. The contributive share of the benet is denoted by
 2 [0; 1] and referred to as the Bismarckian parameter. Making use of the government
budget constraint and assuming away demographic and economic growth for simplicity,
the pension benet b is given by
b = 

(1  )Ewz
p
+ 
wz
p^

;
where Ewz is the average rst-period income,9 1=p is the internal rate of return of the
non-contributory (Beveridgean) collective annuity while 1=p^ with
p^ =
Epwz
Ewz
is the internal rate of return of the contributory (Bismarckian) collective annuity. The
two components of the collective annuity di¤er in both their internal rate of return
and the basis on which this return is applied. Both components redistribute from short-
lived to long-lived agents (since both are based on some aggregate rather than individual
longevity), while the non-contributory part also redistributes across income levels.
All decisions (public and private) are taken by agents in the rst period of their life:
they rst vote over the size () and type () of the collective annuity program, observe
the result of the vote and then decide how much to work (z) and to save (s) privately.10
9Throughout the paper, Ef denotes
R
f(w; p)dH(w; p) for any function f . Similarly, cov(f; g) denotes
E(fg)  E(f)E(g) for any functions f and g.
10Throughout the paper, we assume that only young people vote, and that the majority-chosen
policy remains in place when they retire. With a pay-as-you-go collective annuity program, the voting
behavior of retirees is well known. They favor the proceeds-maximizing contribution rate since their
past contributions are sunk while they enjoy the tax proceeds from the current workers. As for the
systems type, it is easy to see that they have the same preferences as a younger agent of the same
characteristics. Allowing older people to vote then would not bring any new insight.
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As usual, we proceed by backward induction and we rst solve for the individual labor
supply and saving decisions, before moving to the analysis of majority voting over the
characteristics of the public system.
3 Individual choices of labor supply and saving
The rst-order condition (FOC) with respect to private saving s is given by
pu0(d)(1 + r) = u0(x): (2)
The FOC with respect to labor supply z is
 u0(x) h0(z)  (1  )w+ p
p^
wu0(d) = 0: (3)
Using (2) and the fact that u0(x) > 0, equation (3) simplies to
(1 + )w = h0(z);
where
 =

p^(1 + r)
  1 (4)
measures the discounted value of the extra benet to which an individual is entitled
when his tax contribution increases at the margin, net of its cost.
The sign of  depends on the comparison between the gross individual marginal
return of pension, =p^; and the private saving return, 1 + r: If they are equal,  is
nil and the FOC for labor supply simplies to w = h0(z), so that the contribution
rate  does not a¤ect the labor supply decision. If =p^ < 1 + r,  is negative and
labor supply decreases with the tax rate, while a positive value of  means that labor
supply increases with  .11 In all cases, labor supply increases with both the share  and
return 1=p^ of the contributive part, since both increase the individualsreturn from their
own tax contributions. Labor supply is not a¤ected by individual or average survival
probability, thanks to the absence of both income e¤ect in preferences (see (1)) and of
11When z is interpreted as the retirement age, a negative  corresponds to the implicit tax on
continued activitystudied in the pension literature.
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borrowing constraints. Labor supply increases with productivity w irrespective of the
sign of .
The indirect utility (incorporating the optimal choices z and s of all individuals)
is given by
V (;  ; w; p) = u [(1  )wz   s   h(z)]+pu

(1 + r)s + ((1  )Ewz

p
+ 
wz
p^
)

:
(5)
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that the disutility of labor is given by
h(z) =
z2
2
; (6)
so that labor supply becomes
z = (1 + )w;
with12
p^ =
Epwz
Ewz
=
Epw2
Ew2
:
For future reference, note that
cov(w2; p) = Epw2   pEw2
, p^ = p+ cov(w
2; p)
Ew2
; (7)
so that increasing the covariance between life expectancy and productivity while keeping
the marginal distributions of p and w unchanged increases p^ and decreases the labor
supply of all agents (when  > 0), with p^ = p if cov(w2; p) = 0, and p^ > p in the
empirically relevant case where cov(w2; p) > 0. Intuitively, if more productive agents
live longer, the internal rate of return of the Bismarckian public annuity decreases below
the Beveridgean return, and incentives to supply labor decrease as well.
We now study the joint determination by majority voting of the generosity and of the
type of the pension system. We model the joint determination procedure rst suggested
independently by Kramer (1972) and Shepsle (1979). A policy pair (,) is a Kramer-
Shepsle equilibrium, denoted by (KS ; KS), if each element in the pair corresponds
to a majority voting equilibrium given the value taken by the other element i.e., if
12The main advantage of this specication is that p^ does not depend on  or .
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KS = V (KS) and KS = V (KS), where V () denotes the majority-chosen value
of  given  and where V () denotes the majority-chosen value of  given  . We rst
study the choice of  for a given value of .
4 Voting over the size  of the pension system
We rst study the rst-order condition for the individual most-preferred value of  ,
before turning to the majority chosen level. Di¤erentiating a voters utility (5) with
respect to  while using (6) yields the following rst-order condition
w2(1 + ) +
1  
(1 + r)p
(1 + 2)Ew2 = 0: (8)
This condition also corresponds to the maximization of the individuals lifetime income
i.e., (1  )wz + b=(1 + r): in the absence of borrowing constraints, individuals choose
 to maximize their discounted lifetime income (with labor supply z optimally chosen)
and s to reach their optimal allocation across periods.13 The rst term of (8) measures
the marginal impact of increasing  on the discounted Bismarckian (contributive) part
of the pension benet, net of the rst period decrease in disposable income. It has
the same sign as . The second term is the marginal variation in the non-contributive
(Beveridgean) part of the pension benet. Observe that p^ also a¤ects the Beveridgean
term (through ) because it impacts the (dis)incentive to work of all agents, and hence
the return of the non-contributive pension.
The FOC (8) shows that an individuals most preferred level of  depends on
 =
w2
Ew2
:
Consequently, it is convenient to consider a type space over  rather than w (with
med < E =  = 1 since wmed < w). We denote by (; ) individual s most-
preferred tax rate for any given value of .
We obtain the following proposition (proofs are relegated to the appendix).
13We thank Pascal Belan for pointing this to our attention. Observe that (since a similar result holds
for the choice of  given ), results throughout the paper are not a¤ected by the precise shape of the
utility function but hold for any increasing and concave utility function u(:).
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Proposition 1 When agents vote over  for a given , we obtain that
i) there is unanimity in favor of  = 0 if  < 0 and  = 1, and in favor of  = 1 if
 > 0;
ii) if  < 0 and  < 1, (; ) is positive for  = 0, decreases with  and is zero above
some productivity threshold level. Moreover, V () = (med; ).
If the Bismarckian internal rate of return 1=p^ is large enough, compared with the
private savings return, then the individuals discounted contributive part of the annuity
increases more than his tax bill when the tax rate is increased (i.e., the rst term of (8)
is positive for any  when  > 0), even though only a part  of the collective annuity
is contributory. Moreover, increasing  also a¤ects the non-contributory part of the
pension: recall that labor supply is increasing in  when  > 0, so that the second
term in (8) is also positive for any value of  . This is the incentive e¤ect created by
the Bismarckian part of the annuity on the return of the Beveridgean part. As the two
terms of (8) are positive, all individuals favor  = 1.
If  < 0 and  = 1, the pension system is purely contributive with a return lower than
the interest rate. All agents then prefer saving to any positive amount of Bismarckian
collective annuity.
There are then two conditions to be satised for an individual to have an interior
most-preferred size of the collective annuity program: that the system not be purely
contributive ( < 1) and that the net discounted individual marginal return of the
collective annuity, , be negative. When both conditions are satised, individuals below
a threshold productivity level face a trade-o¤ between the redistribution embedded
in the non-contributive component of the collective annuity and the low individual
return of its contributive component. The poorest agent ( = 0) cares only about the
non-contributive part and favors a positive value of  , while individuals with larger
productivities gain less from the redistributive component and most-prefer a lower size
of the overall collective annuity program.
We now look at the choice of  given  , and then move to the Kramer-Shepsle
equilibrium.
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5 Voting over the type  of the pension system
Assume for the time being that  is given exogenously. We proceed as in the previous
section, studying rst the individually-optimal type of collective annuity, and then the
majority-chosen one.
Di¤erentiating the utility function (5) with respect to  while using (6) yields the
following rst-order condition
(1 + )

p
p^
   1

+
1  
p^(1 + r)
 = 0: (9)
By the envelope theorem, the only rst-order impact of  on the utility of voters is
via the induced variation of the collective annuity. The rst term in (9) measures
the composition e¤ect of , increasing the share of the contributive component at the
expense of the non-contributive one. Not surprisingly, it is positive for high productivity
individuals ( > p^=p) and negative otherwise. The second term represents the incentive
impact of a higher  on the return of the Beveridgean component; it is always positive
since a higher  increases labor supply.
Let (; ) denote individual s most-preferred value of  for any given  . Com-
bining the two e¤ects we obtain that all individuals with  > p^=p most-prefer Bismarck
( = 1) whatever the value of  > 0. When interior, the most-preferred value of  is
given by
(; ) =
p^
2p^  p +
1  

p^(1 + r)(p  p^)
2p^  p ; (10)
where p   p^ < 0 < 2p^   p so that the rst term is positive and the second term
negative. The most-preferred value of  increases with : the composition e¤ect of a
larger value of  (the rst term in (9)) increases with the individuals productivity, while
its incentive e¤ect on the Beveridgean tax base is independent of . Since preferences are
single-peaked in , we can apply the median voter theorem to obtain that the majority
voting value of  is the one most-preferred by the median ability individual:
V () = (med; ):
Equation (10) shows that the most-preferred value of  increases with  , because a
higher  increases the labor supply distortions generated by the non-contributive part
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of the annuity. We then obtain that the majority-chosen level of  increases with  as
well.
We now move to the joint determination by majority voting of size and type of the
pension system.
6 The Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium
Since the median productivity individual is decisive when voting both over  given 
and over  given  , we obtain that KS = (med; KS) and KS = (med; KS).
We then obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 i) There is no Shepsle equilibrium with 0 < KS ; KS < 1  i.e., with
interior solutions for both  and .
ii) If p^(1+r) < 1, there is a unique Shepsle equilibrium, with KS = 1 and KS =min(p^=(2p^ 
pmed); 1) 2 [1=2; 1]:
iii) If p^(1 + r) > 1 and med < 1=(p(1 + r)), there is a unique Shepsle equilibrium, with
KS = 0 and KS = 1  1=(2  p(1 + r)med) 2 [0; 1=2]:
iv) If p^(1 + r) > 1 and med  1=(p(1 + r)), there is a unique Shepsle equilibrium, with
KS = 0:
These Kramer-Shepsle equilibria correspond to what is empirically observed: large
Bismarckian systems and smaller Beveridgean ones. Moreover, Proposition 2 explains
under what conditions (on the rate of return of both types of annuities and the median
productivity level) each type of equilibrium arises.
Intuitively these results can be explained as follows. If p^ is small, for instance because
richer people do not have a (much) larger life expectancy than poorer people (see (7)),
the contributive annuitys intrinsic return is large and the Bismarckian system is very
attractive with a large contribution rate. The reason why a purely Bismarckian system
is not always chosen is that the decisive individual benets from redistribution, if her
productivity is low enough, and thus favors the introduction of some non-contributive
part in the collective annuity. If p^ is large (with richer people living much longer
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for instance), the contributive annuity has a low return and voters prefer a purely
Beveridgean system provided that the decisive voters productivity is not too large.
The size of this Beveridgean annuity remains quite low because a purely Beveridgean
system creates large distortions when its size increases. In other words, a large value
of p^ discourages voters from introducing a contributive component into the collective
annuity, which puts an upper bound on the size of the collective program because,
in the absence of a Bismarckian component, the Beveridgean scheme generates large
distortions (on labor supply). Finally, if the Bismarckian intrinsic return is low while
the decisive votersproductivity is large, there is no political support for a collective
annuity scheme, since a majority of voters would rather rely exclusively on private
saving.
We now summarize how the Kramer-Shepsle equilibria are a¤ected by variations in
the joint distribution of longevity and income.
Proposition 3 i) Increasing the covariance between income and life expectancy de-
creases the Bismarckian parameter of the unique Shepsle equilibrium when p^(1+ r) < 1,
and leads to a shift to a purely Beveridgean system when this threshold is crossed. In-
creasing the covariance has no direct impact on the equilibrium size of the (either mostly
Bismarckian, or purely Beveridgean) equilibrium program.
ii) Increasing average longevity when cov(w2; p) = 0 has no impact on the size and
type of a mostly Bismarckian system, but induces a shift to a purely Beveridgean system
when a threshold is reached; it then decreases the equilibrium size of the pension program.
A larger cov(w2; p) decreases the return of the contributive annuity and thus moves
the Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium away from Bismarck. Note that, even though the cov-
ariance does not a¤ect the equilibrium size of the either mostly Bismarckian, or purely
Beveridgean, program, a shift to pure Beveridge goes along with a discontinuous drop in
the size of the program. In other words, increasing the correlation between income and
longevity makes the equilibrium system more redistributive, without impacting directly
its size (although a move to a purely Beveridgean system is accompanied by a lower
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size).
As for average longevity, our model predicts that it has no impact on the (size
or type) of the equilibrium program when longevity is not correlated with income,
as long as average longevity is low enough for the equilibrium program to be mostly
Bismarckian. With the intrinsic returns of contributive and non-contributive systems
equal by assumption (p^ = p), the equilibrium Bismarckian parameter is only a¤ected by
the identity of the median voter, med (with a larger equilibrium KS as med increases
and benets less from the non-contributive annuity). As a threshold level is crossed, the
equilibrium program becomes purely Beveridgean, with a size decreasing with average
life expectancy (which decreases the return of the non-contributive annuity).
7 Numerical illustration
We perform two numerical calibrations, one for a Bismarckian country (France) and
another for a Beveridgean country (UK) and show that our model predicts an equilib-
rium which is in line with the stylized facts observed in reality. That France is mostly
Bismarckian while the UK is mostly Beveridgean can be seen from Conde-Ruiz and
Profeta (2007, Table 2), who show that the correlation between wage and pension is
0.268 for the UK (the lowest value among the 11 European countries reported in the
Table) and 0.658 for France (the third largest value after Spain and Portugal, and larger
than the value for Germany).14
We rst calibrate the distribution function of productivities. Since labor income
is proportional to the square of productivity, we calibrate a lognormal distribution
function of w2. We use the two degrees of freedom available in a lognormal distribution
to replicate two facts about the country income distribution function: (1) an average
income (gross annual wage in 2012 USD PPPs) of 39 600 for France and 44 222 for the
UK,15 and (2) a Gini coe¢ cient for the after-taxes and transfers distribution of 0.293
for France and 0.345 for the UK for the late 2000s.16 We then obtain a median income
14See also Cremer et al. (2000b) for additional evidence.
15OECD data accessed at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_average_wage#OECD.27s_statistics
on April 30, 2014
16OECD data accessed at
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of 34 380 for France and of 36 200 for the UK, corresponding to med = 0:868 for France
and 0.819 for the UK.
We then calibrate p, following the same procedure (and the same length periods) as
in Leroux et al. (2011). We assume that the rst period of life goes from 25 year old to
65, and the second from 65 to 105 year old. The value of p then corresponds to average
life expectancy at age 65, expressed as a proportion of the length of the second period.
The average life expectancy for men at age 65 in 2007 is 17.1 years in France (Cambois
et al. (2008)) and 18 years in the UK.17 Given that the second period lasts 40 years,
this gives
p =
17:1
40
= 0:4275
for France, and
p =
18
40
= 0:45
for the UK.
We then calibrate the relationship between p and income w2. Bommier et al. (2005)
estimates the elasticity of life expectancy to income for men at age 65 in France at 0.18.
We then use the CES functional form for this relationship,
p(w2) = p0(w
2); (11)
with  = 0:18: We then use the denition of average p,
p =
1Z
0
p0(w
2)dF (w2);
to obtain that p0 = 0:21:
We proceed slightly di¤erently for the UK since we have not found estimates of the
elasticity of life expectancy to income. Rather, Attanasio and Emmerson (2001) report
from their computations that for men aged 65 moving from the 40th percentile to the
60th percentile in the wealth distribution (...) increases the probability of survival by
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_income_equality#Gini_coe¢ cient.2C_after_taxes_and_transfers
on the same date
17O¢ ce for National Statistics (August 2012). Statistical Bulletin. Health Expectancies in the United
Kingdom 20002002 to 20082010.
16
3.4 percentage points.18 We use this information, with the same CES functional form
(11), and the denition of p to calibrate equation (11) and we obtain that  = 0:10 and
that p0 = 0:31:
We then obtain that
p^ =
Epw2
Ew2
= 0:45 > p = 0:427
and corr(p; w2) = 0:952 for France, with
p^ =
Epw2
Ew2
= 0:469 > p = 0:45
and corr(p; w2) = 0:92 for the UK.
We assume a real interest rate of 3.6% per year, with the amount of saving divided
into 40 equal deposits made at the end of each working year. If i is the (constant)
interest rate (in real terms) paid each year, then we obtain the following formula (see
Bronshtein et al., 2004):
1 + r =
1
40
(1 + i)40   1
i
;
with i = 3:6%, which yields r = 1:16:19
With these calibrations, we obtain that p^(1 + r) = 0:97 < 1 for France, consistent
with the country being Bismarckian. More precisely, we obtain an equilibrium Bismar-
ckian value of  = 0:85.20 As for the UK, we obtain that p^(1+ r) = 1:01 > 1, consistent
with the country being Beveridgean. More precisely, we obtain an equilibrium Beverid-
gean value of  = 16:9%.21 We can use formula (7) to better understand why the return
of a contributive system, p^, is lower in the UK than in France: it is not due to the
fact that the covariance between income and longevity is larger (on the contrary, it is
smaller in the UK than in France, and moreover divided by a larger average wage in
equation (7)) but rather because average life expectancy at 65 is larger in the UK.
18We model income rather than wealth in this paper, but if we assume that wealth is increasing in
income, the position of an individual in both distributions is the same.
19As an alternative, we have assumed an average real interest rate of 2% per year, which we compound
over 40 years to compute the value of r = 1:21. We obtain results (available upon request) that are very
similar to those reported in the text.
20Koethenbuerger et al (2008) estimate that the Bismarckian factor, measured as 1-progressivity
index, was 0.536 in France in 2005.
21Koethenbuerger et al (2008) estimate that the e¤ective pension contribution rate was 23.7% in the
UK in 2004.
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We perform two comparative static exercises on this data. First, we examine how
the political equilibrium is a¤ected when we increase the correlation between income
and longevity without changing the average life expectancy p. This corresponds to the
rst part of Proposition 3. Since we know that Beveridgean countries are not a¤ected
by such a move, we restrict our attention to France. More precisely, we increase the
value of the elasticity of life expectancy to income in France, ; from the calibrated
value of 0.18 and we report the corresponding political equilibrium in Table 1.
 KS KS
0.18 0.851 1
0.2 0.849 1
0.25 0.840 1
0.27 0.836 1
0.28 0 0.165
Table 1: Political equilibrium in France as a function of 
The results obtained are in line with Proposition 3 (i): for small increases in , the
country remains Bismarckian, but the larger correlation between income and life expect-
ancy reduces the equilibrium value of the Bismarckian parameter. When a threshold
value is reached for  (0.28 in our calibration), the country becomes Beveridgean, with
a much lower contribution rate than in the Bismarckian setting.
The second comparative static exercise consists in increasing the average life ex-
pectancy, while keeping all other parameters unchanged. Observe that this exercise
goes beyond Proposition 3 (ii). The proposition assumes away any correlation between
income and lifetime expectancy, while the correlation is positive in both France and the
UK in our calibrated example. Table 2 reports the political equilibrium in France as a
function of life expectancy at age 65.
Life expect. p p^ KS KS
at 65
17.1 0.4275 0.450 0.851 1
17.5 0.4375 0.460 0.851 1
17.6 0.44 0.463 0 0.148
17.7 0.4425 0.466 0 0.144
Table 2: Political equilibrium in France as a function of average life expectancy at 65
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Increasing life expectancy while maintaining all other assumptions (including  =
0:18) constant results in an increase in both p and p^. As long as the increase in life
expectancy is small, the political equilibrium remains Bismarckian, and the Bismar-
ckian factor remains una¤ected (because the ratio of p and p^ remains constant with
our calibration procedure when life expectancy at 65 is changed). Once a threshold
life expectancy is reached (17.6 years with our calibrations), the equilibrium system be-
comes Beveridgean, with a much lower contribution rate. The Beveridgean equilibrium
contribution rate decreases with life expectancy, as can be seen from Proposition 2 (iii).
As for the UK, the equilibrium pension system of course remains Beveridgean as
life expectancy at 65 increases. The only impact of this variation is to decrease the
majority chosen contribution rate (from 16.9% in the benchmark case to 16.2% when
life expectancy at 65 increases from 18 to 18.2 years, for instance).
8 Conclusion
This paper has developed a model where individuals di¤er in productivity and in longev-
ity (modeled as the probability to be alive in the second period of their life). Individuals
decide how much to work and to save when young. They retire and consume their sav-
ing plus any pension benet when old. The public pension system takes the form of
a collective annuity, with both a contributive (with the benet based on the workers
own contribution) and a non-contributive (based on the average contribution in the eco-
nomy) component. Voters choose both the size or generosity of the system (measured
by the payroll tax rate) and its type or degree of income redistribution (measured by
the relative size of the non-contributory component).
We study the joint determination of both the size and type of pension system and
show that the unique (Kramer-Shesple) equilibrium is either a large (mainly) Bismar-
ckian system, a smaller (purely) Beveridgean pension, or no public pension at all. This
equilibrium pattern corresponds to what is observed in reality, with larger Bismarckian
than Beveridgean systems. Moreover, our model predicts which type of equilibrium
should emerge given the characteristics of the income and longevity distributions and
of their correlation. We calibrate the model to the situation of France and the UK and
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obtain a largeBismarckian system for France and a smallBeveridgean system in
the UK. Consequently, our model can contribute to explaining the stylized pattern of
pension systems that is observed in reality.
Our analysis makes uses of two simplifying assumptions: we assume away borrow-
ing constraints, so that saving can be negative, and we assume that the disutility from
working can be expressed in consumption terms, independently of income. These two
assumptions taken together simplify a lot the solving of the model, since preferences
for collective annuities are made independent of individual longevity. The rst of the
two assumptions may strike the reader as especially strong, since it often (but not al-
ways) results in some voters favoring a conscatory payroll tax (even in the presence of
labor supply distortions from income taxation). The introduction of explicit borrowing
constraints would complicate the model a lot without bringing much new insight. Spe-
cically, rather than favoring conscatory tax rates, individuals would favor the largest
value of the payroll tax consistent with non-negative saving. This would prevent people
from favoring extremely large values of the payroll tax, but it would not a¤ect the
qualitative results we have obtained in our simpler framework.
Finally, our political economy (median voter) model makes several assumptions that
are common in that literature. These include for instance the hypotheses that voters
are farsighted, selsh and vote directly on the characteristics of the pension systems,
rather than for parties that propose pension policies bundled with many other policy
dimensions. Additional insights would certainly be gained if these assumptions were
lifted.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
(i) The proof follows immediately from the FOC (8).
(ii) From (8), we obtain that
(0; ) =
p^(1 + r)
2(p^(1 + r)  ) ;
which is positive when  < 0 and  < 1.
From (8), we also observe that (; ) decreases with  when  dened by (4) is
negative. Furthermore, there exists a threshold value of  such that people above this
threshold most prefer  = 0. We denote this threshold by
~() =
p^
p
1  
p^(1 + r)  :
This threshold is positive when  < 0. Note that the SOC need only be satised when 
is an interior solution and satises the FOC with equality. Straighforward computations
show that this is the case when  < 0,  < 0 and  < ~().
Finally, since the preferences are single-peaked over  , we can apply the median
voter theorem to obtain that V () = (med; ):
B Proof of Proposition 2
i) This can be shown by solving simultaneously (9) and (8), the necessary conditions
for an interior solution. This yields
KS = 1;
KS = 1  1
1  p^(1 + r) ;
which cannot be an equilibrium because it species a level KS =2 [0; 1] whatever the
value of p^(1 + r).
ii) Assume that p^(1 + r) < 1.
 If med > p^=p, (med; ) = 1 (all individuals with  > p^=p most prefer Bismarck
whatever the value of ) and (med; 1) = 1, so that KS = 1 and KS = 1.
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 If med < p^=p, there are two possible equilibria: ( = 0;  > 0) and ( > 0;  = 1).
First candidate for equilibrium: ( = 0;  > 0)
If  = 0, solving (8) with med = w2med=Ew
2 gives the majority chosen
interior value of  . Observe that
med <
p^
p
<
1
p(1 + r)
= ~(0);
so that the majority chosen value of  is positive. We then replace  by this
value in the rst-order condition for  given by equation (9), and we solve it
for  = 0 to obtain
@V (0;  ; )
@
=
 1 + p^(1 + r)
p^(1 + r)( 2 + p(1 + r)med) ;
which is positive because p^(1 + r) < 1 and p(1 + r)med < 1, a contradiction
with the assumption that  = 0:
 Second candidate for equilibrium: ( > 0;  = 1)
If  = 1, solving the rst-order condition (10) for  gives
(med; 1) =
p^
2p^  pmed 2 [1=2; 1]
since med < p^=p:We then replace  by this value in the rst-order condition
for  , and we evaluate it at  = 1 to obtain
@V (1;  ; )
@
=
 1 + p^(1 + r)
p(1 + r)2( 2p^+ pmed)
which is positive, conrming that KS = 1.
iii and iv) Assume that p^(1 + r) > 1 and that KS = 0. From the FOC for 
measured at  = 0, we infer that
KS = 1  1
2  p(1 + r)med ;
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which decreases with p(1 + r)med and is non-negative (and at most equal to 1/2)
provided that p(1 + r)med < 1. Evaluating the FOC with respect to  at this value of
 , we obtain
@V (;  ; w; p)
@
=
1  p^(1 + t)
p^(1 + r)(2  p(1 + r)med) < 0;
which proves iii). If p(1 + r)med > 1, we evaluate the FOC with respect to  for  = 0
to obtain
@V (;  ; w; p)
@
=
p
p^
med   1
<
1
p^(1 + r)
  1 since p(1 + r)med > 1;
< 0 since p^(1 + r) > 1;
which proves iv).
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